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Abstract: Primary enrolment rates are very high in Peru, but so are the failure and 
drop-out rates, especially beyond the primary level. Thus  an analysis of  child 
schooling should take account of the conditional sequence with the previous level and 
self-selection into the next higher level of schooling. This cannot be done using 
standard univariate or ordered logit/probit models of school enrolment/grade 
attainment.  This paper applies a  unique  correlated sequential probit model  with 
unobserved individual specific heterogeneity  to  determine the  nature of school 
progression  at primary, secondary and post-secondary levels i n Peru.  This entails 
richer results, argued to be better than the standard static estimates. In particular, 
parental education, household expenditure, sibling composition and local adult market 
participation rates are found to affect different levels of schooling differently. While 
parental education is crucial for child school enrolment at the primary level, sibling 
composition and household expenditure turn out to be significant for attainment at the 
secondary level. However, grade repetition at primary a nd secondary levels and 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
There have been a large and growing number of empirical studies examining the 
determinants of child schooling in developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. Different indicators of schooling have been used in this literature, including 
completed years (Birdsall, 1985), current enrolment (Singh, 1992), ever attended 
(Cochrane, Mehra and Osheba, 1986), grades attained or grades failed (Drèze and 
Kingdon, 2001) and delayed enrolment (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1994). The estimation                                       
n is often separated for boys and girls and for rural and urban areas. Both demand 
(e.g., household income and parental education) and supply (e.g., variables reflecting 
quantity and quality of schools; see Drèze and Kingdon, 2001) factors have been 
identified as explanations for low educational attendance and attainments in these 
low-income regions. Most of these studies are essentially static in nature: u sually 
ordinary least squares or two-stage least squares  methods are used to determine 
completed years of schooling; determination of s chool enrolment/ever attended is 
often based on some univariate probit/logit method while  ordered probit/logit models 
are used to determine grades attained.  
Using 1994 Peru Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) data, we 
examine the nature school progression among 10 to 20 years old Peruvian children. 
Unlike many Asian or African countries a very high proportion (about 97% in our 
sample) of  Peruvian  children gets enrolled in primary schools while failures and 
dropout rates too are significantly higher beyond the primary levels. Existing studies 
on Peru however tend to overlook these important features of schooling. For example,   2 
Ray (2000a) uses univariate logit estimates to analyse the key determinants of child 
labour
1 in Peru
2 and Pakistan. In a subsequent attempt Ray (2000b) uses separate 
univariate logit estimates of child schooling and child labour in these two countries 
and their interaction with adult labour. Patrinos and Psacharapoulos (1997; P&P 
hereafter) made a more direct attempt to capture late entry and high failure rates as 
they use a univariate logit model to determine an aggregated index of age-grade 
distortion called the over-age indicator. This indicator measures if the child under 
consideration had a normal progress (in terms of schooling years) relative to his/her 
current age. Although this measure serves as a proxy for school repetition and late 
entry (because presence of overaged children in the classroom reduces overall 
quality), there are some difficulties. First, the over-age indicator does not distinguish 
between enrolment/attainment at primary, secondary or post secondary levels and as 
such cannot take account of the sequential nature of school progression where there is 
self-selection from one level to the next higher level. More seriously, the over-age 
indicator is determined u sing child employment as an explanatory variable, which 
raises serious endogeneity issue in these household decision models.    
We depart from this tradition and develop a dynamic sequential framework of 
school progression conditional on attainment at the previous level and self-selection 
into the next higher level.  This is based on  a unique correlated sequential probit 
model
3, which allows us to identify the children who have progressed much less than 
others and also to locate at what level of schooling this has happened. This is 
                                                                 
1 Child’s participation in wage employment constitutes important opportunity costs of schooling. There 
is now a growing literature on child labour in many low-income countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. A useful collection of articles in this respect can be found in Grootaert and Patrinos (2000). 
Child labour i s however endogeneous to child schooling and very few studies determine child 
schooling after taking account of child labour.   
2 This study too is based on 1994 Peru LSMS data as ours.  
3 The only use of this model in a schooling context that I am aware of is a study of intergenerational 
educational mobility in Malaysia (Lillard and Willis, 1994) where the effect of parental education on 
child education is studied.    3 
important for any assessment of policies geared to boost child schooling because it is 
based on a full understanding of the nature of the selection process across different 
levels of schooling. We shall, i n  particular,  focus on the following three levels of 
transition: (a) considering all sample children, whether a child gets enrolled in a 
primary school; (b) among those enrolled in primary schools, whether a child moves 
to the secondary level and (c) among those enrolled in secondary schools, whether a 
child moves on to the post-secondary level. While decision (a) relates to school 
enrolment, decisions (b) and (c) relate to school attainment, i.e., school progression 
from primary to secondary level and that from secondary to post-secondary levels 
respectively. Thus our analysis of child school progression combines both indicators 
of enrolment and attainment in a sequential framework. Movement from the primary 
to the secondary level is conditional on the successful completion of the final year of 
the primary school; similarly moving from the secondary to the post-secondary level 
requires one to pass the final year at the secondary level. We also take account of the 
process of self-selection at each higher level as only a fraction of children 
successfully completing primary (or secondary) schools will move on to the 
secondary (or post-secondary) schools
4. In addition to child’s ability, we control for 
sibling composition, household resource constraint, parental preferences and some 
community characteristics and obtain selectivity corrected correlated sequential probit 
estimates of school progression.  
The paper is novel in a number of ways. Standard modelling techniques used 
in most existing studies on child schooling  (including those specific to Peru) fail to 
capture the specific characteristics of child schooling in Peru, where primary 
enrolment rates are high along with high failures and drop out rates. Thus school 
                                                                 
4 For example, decision (b) selects those who successfully complete primary level and move on to the 
secondary level while decision (c) selects those completing secondary schools and move on to the post-  4 
progression is a better indicator of child schooling than school enrolment/attainment. 
In this respect,  sequential probit estimates are argued to be better than the 
corresponding ordered probit estimates.  For someone at the secondary level, for 
example, the sequential probit model takes account of the fact that the person has 
completed the primary level to reach the secondary level while the ordered probit 
model  neither takes account of  the achievement at the previous level  nor does it 
correct for any self-selection into the next higher level of schooling. We have also 
calculated a likelihood ratio statistic to compare the sequential and ordered probit 
estimates.  Secondly, w e  have  taken account of the individual-level unobserved 
heterogeneity that has not been considered by most existing studies. For example, 
individual health problem, ability/disability, if any, may significantly affect school 
enrolment/attainment though we do not observe  this in our data set. Ignoring  the 
unobserved heterogeneity may  however seriously bias estimates of schooling. We 
compare estimates with and without individual specific unobserved heterogeneity and 
find that unobserved heterogeneity is significant in our sample. Thirdly, though a 
child’s labour market participation is considered to be an important indicator of the 
opportunity cost of schooling,  it is endogenous to his/her schooling decisions and 
cannot be entered as an explanatory variable in the schooling equation as in P&P, for 
example. Given the problems of measuring these costs in the LSMS data
5, we instead 
include local (segment-specific) participation rates in home production and market 
jobs to obtain indirect evidence of the effect of job market participation on schooling 
at primary, secondary and post-secondary levels. Fourthly, h ousehold resource 
constraint plays an important role in determining child’s school progression effect in 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
secondary level.   
5 For example, we only observe child’s labour market participation in the past month or in the past year 
that may not represent child’s labour market participation at the point when the a particular schooling 
decision was made.    5 
societies characterised by capital market imperfections. Although household income 
is generally used in this respect, there are fluctuations in income from period to period 
especially in rural areas; hence, we consider household per capita expenditure to be a 
long-term indicator of household income. Since household expenditure is endogenous 
to decisions regarding  child schooling, we use expenditure per capita predicted by 
characteristics of the household head (e.g., if male, if married, if educated), his/her 
spouse (e.g., if educated), household ownership of various assets and variables 
reflecting household demographic composition. Finally, we transform the continuous 
age variable into piecewise linear age splines, which allows for discrete non-linearity 
in  analysing the effects of different age ranges  on  different levels of schooling 
(primary/secondary/post-secondary). The latter would also reflect the incidence of 
over-aged students at different levels of schooling. In other words, these age splines 
offer indirect evidence of late entry, if any, at a given level of schooling.  
Most existing studies suggest how individual/household characteristics affect 
school enrolment/attainment. O ur results  are richer  than most of these e xisting 
studies, allowing us to explicitly establish  how  different individual, household and 
community characteristics may affect school progression at different levels differently. 
In general, child’s ability, sibling composition, parental education and some 
community characteristics turn out to be significant determinants of school 
progression at any level though these factors may affect schooling at different levels 
differently. For example, P&P suggest that having a greater number of younger 
siblings means more age-grade distortion. We however find that age composition of 
siblings is important only at the secondary level though not at the primary or post-
secondary level. Secondly, father’s schooling is significant for age-grade distortion in 
P&P’s study though we find parental education is significant for primary and   6 
secondary levels, but not for post-secondary levels. Thirdly, existing studies generally 
highlight the adverse effects of job market participation on child schooling. However, 
assuming a child’s participation in wage employment is a fraction of the local adult 
market participation rate, we find that local market participation rate has adverse 
effects on school performance only at the post-secondary levels. The latter perhaps 
reflects the flexibility of part-time occupations in Peru so that there are no adverse 
effects on schooling at lower levels, but only at a much higher level. Finally the 
likelihood ratio test rejects the equality of parameters of sequential and ordered probit 
models at 1% or lower level of significance. 
The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 discusses the analytical 
framework while section 3 describes the data, analyses the sequential probit estimates 
and compares these estimates with the corresponding ordered probit estimates.   




2. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Traditionally, demand for schooling is derived from the  Beckerian ‘common 
preference’ model of household behaviour.  Here a household maximises the joint 
utility function of all its members to determine the quantity and quality of children, 
consumption of leisure and other market goods as well as adult/child labour market 
participation decisions.  
We  rationalise the sequential analysis of school progression in terms of a 
simplified framework with only two levels of schooling, namely, primary and 
secondary
6. Assuming that primary school enrolment is compulsory (since most 
children in Peru are enrolled in primary schools), parents only choose whether to send 
                                                                 
6 This could easily be extended to include a third level of schooling, namely, post-secondary level.   7 
a child to the secondary level. Provided a child is able to move from the primary to 
the secondary level, parents would send a child to a secondary school if and only if 
the discounted value of returns from additional schooling tomorrow is higher than the 
discounted value of the additional cost today. Assuming children born to same parents 
are of similar ability, parental investment in secondary schooling would depend on 
costs of schooling (net of returns),  parental attitude towards higher  schooling, 
available  household resources, especially  in societies with  credit market 
imperfections. Composition of siblings may also be important to capture household 
resource constraint or implicit opportunity costs of schooling, if any.  
Peruvian children play an important role in production and other domestic 
work within the household. Both the Peruvian educational system and flexibility in 
part-time occupations often  accommodate dual school-work activities especially at 
lower levels of schooling. Though education is primarily free in Peru (in terms of 
school fees) schooling costs can be significant in terms of costs on transportation, 
school uniform, utensils etc., especially for the poor. There are also issues relating to 
the opportunity cost of lost child earnings, which are also more important for children 
from poorer background. Given these (explicit and opportunity) costs of schooling, 
resource constrained parents may decide to send some children to schools while 
reserving others for home production and/or wage employment supplementing family 
incomes; the latter may in turn give rise to an inequality among siblings with respect 
to school progression. More educated parents, even if resource constrained, may still 
perceive higher returns to higher schooling and  thus are more likely to encourage 
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3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our analysis of sequential school progression among Peruvian children  is based on 
the most recent 1994 Peru Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) data. In the 
Peruvian system, there are six grades within primary schools and 5 grades within 
secondary schools. Assuming six to be the normal school entry age and no failures in 
any grade, a child would start secondary school at around age 12 and post-secondary 
school around age 1 7. However, late enrolments are common in South America 
(Psacharopoulos, 1997), especially in rural areas (Ilon and Moock, 1991. Hence we 
focus on children aged 10-20 years for our analysis. 
There are a total of 3873 male and female children belonging to 1840 
households in our sample. Only 3% of the sample children have zero level of 
education either because they have not been enrolled in a primary school or have left 
school soon after being enrolled. A s high as 97% of the sample children  were 
currently enrolled in primary/secondary/post secondary schools and all these children 
thus have some level of primary education. Students currently enrolled in secondary 
and post secondary schools have some level of secondary schooling while only those 
enrolled in post-secondary schools have completed secondary schooling. Considering 
the highest level of educational achievement, we consider three sequentially related 
transition  decisions. First, whether a child has some level of primary education. 
Among the total 3873 children, only 120 (3%) have no schooling. Thus, 3753 children 
have some positive level of primary education. The second decision is whether a child 
has moved from a primary to a secondary school. Among 3753 children enrolled in a 
primary school, a total of 2030 children have gone to the secondary level. The rest 
(1723 children) have either not been able to complete the primary level or have not   9 
gone to a secondary school even after successfully completing the primary level. 
Finally the third decision is whether to move on to a post-secondary school. Among 
2030 children aged 10-20 years, only 186 have gone beyond the secondary level while 
others have either not been able to complete the secondary level or have decided not 
to go to post-secondary level, even after completion of the secondary schools.  
Adding these numbers, there is a cumulative total of (3753 + 2030 + 186) = 
5969 children in the age group 10-20 years in our sample who have some positive 
level of schooling
7. If we calculate the proportion of the children in each category out 
of the cumulative total of 5969 children with some schooling in this sequential 
framework, there are an alarmingly decreasing proportion of children progressing 
beyond the primary level of schooling. In particular, 63% have some level of primary 
education while only 34% (about half) have some level of secondary schooling. Only 
about 3% of these children have some post-secondary level of schooling.  
 
3.1. A Sequential Probit Model of Child Schooling 
Suppose an index of child quality is the level of schooling attained. Here we consider 
three schooling decisions ranked in ascending order: (a) whether to attend primary 
school; (b) whether to attend secondary schools or stop after the primary level and (c) 
whether to move on to post-secondary levels or stop after the secondary level.  
Accordingly, we can define S as indicating the levels of schooling as follows:  
S = 0 if no formal education 
        = 1 if some level of primary education  
        = 2 if some level of secondary education 
                                                                 
7 Although we observe a cross-section of children 10-20 years old surveyed in 1994, by virtue of the 
conditional sequence of the schooling decisions, we can convert the data on schooling choices into a 
sequential one. Thus the total number of observations included in the sequential analysis of school 
progression turns out to be 6089, which is 5969 plus 120 children never enrolled.    10 
        = 3 if some level of post-secondary education 
The conventional approach would be to apply an ordered probit/logit model (e.g., see 
Kingdon, 1998) of school progression that allows one to estimate the probability that 
S = 0, 1, 2, 3 among the sample children. However, these decisions are not only 
ordered, but also sequential in nature and as such decision (b) is conditional on 
decision (a) and decision (c) is conditional on decision (b). Thus ordered probit 
estimates would be biased since it does not take account of the conditional sequence 
or aspect of self-selection involved in these decisions
8. Hence, following Lillard and 
Willis (1994), we model this problem as a correlated sequential probit model where 
the probit index functions at each decision point s = 0, 1, 2, 3 for a child i belonging 
to household j is given by:  
 
where the decision to move from one level to the next higher level depends on a set of 
covariates X sij which vary by the schooling decision (s), individual child (i) and also 
the household (j). We also include an individual-level unobserved heterogeneity term 
dij that is constant across schooling decision s, which will account for the unobserved 
ability/disability, other  health problems, if any, of a child that may affect school 
progression. The remaining residual variation is assumed to be captured by u sij. Both 
dij and Usij are assumed to be normally distributed as follows:  
                                                                 
8 Similar concerns may also be raised against the  use of univariate probit regressions to individually 
determine primary, secondary or post-secondary scholing levels, thus strenthening the justification for 
the case of a correlated sequential probit model.  
u X ' I sij ij sij s sij + d + b =
) , 0 ( ~
) 1 , 0 ( ~




sij  11 
The residual structure is basically a random effect variance component model with up 
to three replications. The number of replications is determined within the model and 
higher order decisions are made only for positive outcomes at earlier decisions. We 
incorporate residual heterogeneity to obtain consistent estimates as well as consistent 
standard errors (see Lillard and Willis, 1994 p. 1136-37).   
Thus individual i will move from level S to S+1 if I sij > 0 and drop out 
otherwise.  
          P(s = S) = P[I0ij £ 0]  if S = 0 
                = P [I1ij >0, I2ij £0] if S = 1 
                        = P [I1ij >0, I2ij >0, I3ij £0] if S = 2 
              = P [I1ij >0, I2ij >0, I3ij >0] if S = 3 
In other words, decision to move to the next higher level is correlated with the 
previous decision and also the subsequent decisions are subject to selectivity
9 with 
respect to earlier decisions.  
 
  3.2. Model Specification 
For a given level of schooling, the probability of success to move from one level to 
the next higher level depends not only on the ability of the child, but also on factors 
affecting parental investment in child schooling, including opportunity costs of 
schooling,  parental  resources and  preferences, community characteristics defining 
local health/education/employment environment . It is, however, difficult to measure 
or observe many of these factors in household survey data of a given year. Hence, we 
apply great care to choose the most relevant available indicators.  
                                                                 
9 For example, we do not select children who complete primary schools but do not go to secondary 
schools.    12 
Age and past grade performance of the child are used as instruments of the 
child’s ability
10. We consider the quartile age distribution of the children in the age 
group10-20 years and found that the first quartile is 12 years (which is also the normal 
entry year at the secondary level) while the third quartile is 17 years (which is the 
normal entry year for the post-secondary level). Using these two quartile age figures 
as two nodes, we generate a piecewise-linear spline transformation of the age 
variable. The latter gave rise to 3 new variables AGE12 (between 10-12 years), 
AGE1217 (between 12-17 years) or AGEGT17 (above 17 years). Each new variable 
represents the original age variable on a specific segment of its range so that the 
estimated effect of the splines is no longer linear, but piece-wise linear. These spline 
coefficients may directly be interpreted as slope coefficients (Panis, 1994). Secondly, 
we include the number of years failed at the primary level (FAILPRIM) and the total 
number of years failed at primary and secondary levels (FAILPS) as indicators of a 
child’s ability at secondary and post-secondary levels respectively.
11  
 Individual child’s participation in wage employment, if any, constitutes an 
important measure of opportunity costs of schooling. In our original sample of 3873 
children, only about 10% children actively participated in some wage employment in 
the last month of the survey date. While only 4 children without any education 
worked during this reference period, 175 (about 10%) of 1723 children with primary 
education worked. Among the rest, 192 (10.4%) of 1844 children with secondary 
education and only 17 (9%) of 186 children with post-secondary education worked. 
Also this information does not correspond to the decision points of moving from 
primary to secondary or from secondary to higher schools. It is therefore difficult to 
                                                                 
10 The unobserved component of ability is taken care of by the individual-level unobserved 
heterogeneity (see discussion in section 3.1 and also later in section 3.2). 
11 One may also argue that grade repetition at primary and secondary levels too are endogeneous since in part it 
may be caused by the decision regarding number of days attended in a school. Hence we have also estimated a    13 
use this information in a sequential analysis of child school progression. Moreover 
child’s participation in  wage employment is endogenous to his/her participation in 
schooling. Hence to avoid the possible problem of endogeneity,  we  include local 
(segment specific) adult participation rates in home production and job markets 
instead in the schooling equations. Though imperfect, these participation rates would 
be exogenous and would account for its effect on school enrolment/attainment at 
different levels.
12 In particular, we include two variables, namely, OWN and MKT to 
denote local (specific to the particular segment of the rural location) adult 
participation rates in home production and market jobs respectively in the last one 
week. There are about 51% male in all the three samples corresponding to these three 
sequential schooling decisions. Similar proportions of male (44%) and female (45%) 
children had attained primary schools while a slightly higher proportion of boys (49% 
as against 46% for girls) attained secondary schools in our sample. Thus the apparent 
evidence of gender difference in schooling achievements is rather limited in our 
sample, as has been noted by Patrinos and Psacharapoulos (1997) as well for 1991 
Peru LSMS data-set. Nevertheless we create two gender interaction terms 
MALEOWN and MALEMKT to account for the possible gender difference, if any.  
Household resource constraint, if any, may exert an important influence on 
child schooling in  societies with imperfect c redit markets. Household income or 
expenditure is usually considered to be a measure of resource constraint
13. But in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
parsimonius model by dropping these possibly endogenous variables. These estimates are shown in Appendix table 
A2, which retain our basic results. 
12 We have also considered including the wages of unskilled adults as an alternative to participation 
rates. LSMS provides information about the last payment in the past 7 days or past 12 months. This 
however would not be representative of the wages at the time when these schooling decisions were 
made. Though similar arguments would also apply to using participation rates, adult participation rates 
are subject to less fluctuations than adult unskilled wage rates over time. Hence we shall only use adult 
participation rates to account for opportunity costs of schooling in our analysis.  
13 We consider per capita expenditure as an indicator of household long-term income since we do not 
observe the household income at each point of child’s schooling decisions (e.g., whether to move to 
primary, secondary or post-secondary schools).    14 
household model, household income/expenditure is endogenous. Hence, we first 
predict per capita expenditure in terms of characteristics of the household head, 
his/her spouse, household assets and other family composition variables (assumed to 
be given for the cross-section sample for the survey year) and use this predicted value 
as a measure of household resources.  
Age  distribution of siblings is  also included to account for the implicit 
opportunity costs of schooling, if any. Following P&P (1997), we classify siblings 
into three age categories: (a) pre-school group aged 0-6 years, (b) school-going group 
aged 7-18 years and (c) working group aged above 18 years. These age composition 
variables would, therefore, takes a ccount of the competition among siblings, 
especially younger ones (who are not in working age category) for limited household 
resources. Thus larger number of dependent (non-earner) siblings would impose a 
more stringent resource constraint as the available family resources will be divided 
among more consumption units. Faced with this resource constraint, households may 
use different children to specialise in different activities including school 
participation, home production or wage employment
14.  
Parental education is expected to account for parental attitude towards sending 
children to secondary or higher schools.  It may also affect a child’s motivation to do 
well in a school. In this respect, we include three levels of parental education namely, 
primary, secondary and post-secondary levels of schooling, for father (HEADEDN1, 
HEADEDN2, HEADEDN3) and  mother (HSPEDN1, HSPEDN2, HSPEDN3). 
Among other household characteristics, we include the predicted value of per capita 
current expenditure on food, health and education (PREDEXP) as an instrument. As a 
                                                                 
14 These sibling composition variables may also be regarded as endogenous, though in our single 
crosssection framework we assume away the dynamics of family composition. However, in order to 
check the robustness of our estimates, we also estimate a model by excluding these sibling composition   15 
direct measure of borrowing constraint, we include if the household has an existing 
long-term borrowing (DEBT). We also include if the household comes from an 
indigenous Peruvian community (INDIG); the omitted category here is the Spanish-
speaking community. An overwhelming majority (about 85%) of children belonged to 
Spanish-speaking households as compared to indigenous Peruvian population
15. We 
also consider if the household is headed by a male member and in as high as 88% 
cases the child came from a male-headed household
16. These household 
characteristics may also account for household resource constraint, parental 
preferences as well as an interaction between these factors. 
  One also needs to control for the supply-side factors, if possible. In the 
absence of other factors signifying supply of schooling, we include type of school 
(public/private/ parochial) attended. Choice of a school, e.g., a private (fee paying) 
school, may reflect parental motivation to produce children of better quality (i.e., with 
higher schooling). However, for given level of parental education, it may also account 
for the quality of services provided by public/private schools An overwhelming 
majority (87%) of the sample children attended public school as opposed to only 7% 
attending private schools; the rest went to parochial schools. We include the variable 
PUBLIC to denote whether the child has gone to a public school. We also include a 
variable RURAL to indicate if the child lives in a rural location. Residential location 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
variables. These estimates are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, which essentially retains the basic 
results as shown in Table 2. See further discussion in section 3.3.   
15 In the Peruvian Society Spanish-speaking European descendants are at the top of the Peruvian social 
ladder while the monolingual indigenous language speakers are at the bottom. Other Spanish-speaking 
indigenous people (e.g., mestizos, cholos) are in the intermediate ranks. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 
(1994) suggest that almost half the monolingual indigenous population is concentrated in the bottom 
income decile of the Peruvian income distribution.    
16 We started our estimation by including all different characteristics of the household head (e.g., if the 
head is male, married, occupation of the head etc.) among other variables. However, except 
HEADMALE all other characteristics turned out to be insignificant. Hence we have dropped other 
characteristics of the head of the household from the final specification.   16 
may signify the distance from the local schools or the quality of local public services, 
e.g., health/education/employment, in relation to an urban area. 
   Finally we  need to  take account of the unobserved individual-level 
heterogeneity as Lillard and Willis (1994) suggested that individual specific 
heterogeneity played a significant role in explaining inter-generational educational 
mobility in Malaysia. This may  capture the unobserved individual specific 
ability/disability or other health problems, if any, that are not observable in our data-
set, but that may significantly affect school performance of these children.  
  There are some identifying variables in these three equations corresponding to 
three levels of schooling and these relate to past performance (i.e., grade repetition) at 
primary and secondary levels and also the marital status of the individual. In 
particular, past performance and marital status are not important for children’s 
enrolment at the primary level. However, we include number of failed years at 
primary levels (FAILPRIM) for the progression primary to secondary level. But the 
question of being married does not seem to be important for these children in our 
sample. Finally, we include the number of f ailed years in primary as well as 
secondary levels (FAILPS) and also the marital status (MARRIED) in determining 
whether a student moves from secondary to post-secondary level. We, however, retain 
very similar parental and household characteristics for all three schooling decisions 
(including the age splines)
 17.  
  Endogeneity is a common problem in the choice of regression variables in this 
respect. This is because in life cycle models of household decisions quantity (i.e., 
family size determining sibling composition) and quality (i.e., child schooling, child 
labour) of children, marital status, household earnings and expenditure are all jointly   17 
determined. It is however difficult to drop all these variables and yet estimate a 
meaningful model of child schooling. Since our analysis is based on  single cross-
section information (for 1994), we may however assume number of children, their 
birth order, marital status etc. to be given for this year and thus ignore the dynamics of 
fertility, consumption choices and their implications for child schooling.
18 There are 
also some measurement problems as all our observations relate to the year 1994 and 
not when the schooling decisions were made. Hence, we consider the values of the 
regression variables observed in 1994 as instruments for the values of these variables 
when schooling decisions were made. This would allow us to focus on the hypotheses 
of our interest regarding child school progression. 
Summary statistics of the selected arguments of school progression are shown 
in Table 1 for the sample children classified by three levels of schooling.  
 
3.3 Results 
Maximum likelihood sequential probit estimates with and without individual specific 
heterogeneity are summarised in Table 2 for three levels of schooling. A comparison 
of these  two sets of  estimates suggests some differences. Most often there are 
differences in t-statistics (though often  not very significant); m ore importantly, one 
can identify significant differences: for example, mother’s education is significant for 
primary schooling if we do not consider heterogeneity, but turns out to be 
insignificant when heterogeneity is included. In contrast, father’s highest level of 
education is significant for secondary schooling when we include heterogeneity, but 
not when  we do not. These differences are strengthened by the highly significant 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
17 We include all three age variables in all three schooling equations to account for the non-linear effects of age, if 
any, on the particular level of schooling. Inclusion of these age variables also indicate evidence of late entry, if 
any, especially at primary/secondary level.    18 
value of individual level heterogeneity terms for all three levels of schooling. We thus 
conclude that ignoring unobserved individual level heterogeneity would give rise to 
biased estimates and proceed to interpret the sequential probit estimates with 
heterogeneity for different levels of schooling. We also compare these estimates with 
those of the restricted models presented in Table A1 and Table A2 of the Appendix. 
In general, these restricted estimates yield very similar results with respect to the 
common variables as shown in Table 2. One interesting difference is that the indicator 
of expenditure turn out to be more significant when we exclude the sibling age 
composition variables (see Table A1), thus strengthening our hypothesis that these 
sibling composition variables account for the implicit opportunity costs of schooling 
among resource constrained households in societies with imperfect credit markets. 
From non-enrolment to  enrolment at primary level: Among various child 
characteristics, there is some indirect evidence of late entry in that children aged 
between 12-17 years may still be at the primary level while children above 17 years 
are significantly less likely to be in this l evel. Neither sibling characteristics nor 
household expenditure are very important for the primary school enrolment. However, 
parental education plays an important role for child’s primary schooling. Primary and 
secondary education of the father as well as primary education of the mother 
significantly enhances the likelihood of primary education. Finally higher local 
market participation rate significantly encourages (in stead of lowering) achievement 
at the primary level.  
  Progression from primary to secondary schools: At the secondary level, 
however, more factors turn out to be significant for explaining child’s school 
attainment. First, the probability of secondary schooling increases between age 10-17 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
18 In order to check the robustness of our results, we also estimate some parsimonium  models  by 
excluding these possibly endogenous variables (see Appendix).   19 
years, but decreases thereafter. Child’s performance at the primary level is also 
important in that higher number of failures at the primary level lowers secondary 
schooling attainment. Unlike primary education, instrument of household expenditure 
is significant such that higher expenditure raises the probability of secondary 
attainment. Among various sibling composition variables, larger number of siblings in 
the working age group (SIBGT18) significantly enhances secondary school 
attainment. While more infant siblings lower the attainment at the secondary level, the 
variable SIB06 is not statistically significant. In other words, individuals from poorer 
household and/or with more dependent siblings are less likely to move from primary 
to secondary schools. Taken together, the latter reflects significant effects of 
household resource constraint and competition for limited resources among the 
siblings on secondary schooling. As before, parental education plays an important role 
– all levels of paternal education and primary level of maternal education variables 
significantly enhance the likelihood of moving to secondary schools. School quality is 
also statistically significant: children from public schools are less likely to do well at 
the secondary level.  
  Progression from secondary to post-secondary schools: In this case child’s age 
and indicator of ability turn out to be more important than household resource 
constraint or parental education. Whether children attain some post-secondary level of 
education significantly depends on age and grade repetition at the primary and 
secondary levels. In particular, the probability of moving to a post-secondary school 
increases between age 12-17 years. Children who do not perform well at primary and 
secondary levels of education are also less likely to  move up the post-secondary 
levels. As before, children from public schools are less likely to have higher level of 
post-secondary education. Also important is the local market participation rate; the   20 
likelihood of post-secondary attainment is lower if the local market participation rates 
are higher, thus providing some indirect evidence of an adverse effect of wage 
employment on child schooling (despite flexibility of part-time occupations in Peru). 
However, the instrument of household expenditure or sibling age-composition 
variables is not significant. We also do not find any evidence of significant gender 
differences in this respect.  
  Finally, we compare these sequential probit estimates with the corresponding 
ordered probit estimates (with and without individual specific u nobserved 
heterogeneity). These ordered probit estimates (see Table 3) generally yield standard 
results (not corrected for self-selection at different stages of schooling). Unlike the 
sequential probit estimates, order probit ones cannot however show how  different 
characteristics would affect different levels of schooling differently. We also compute 
likelihood ratio statistics to test if sequential and ordered probit estimates are equal. 
These statistics are 903.50 and 882.38 respectively for estimates with and without 
heterogeneity, thus both rejecting the null hypothesis of any equality between these 
two sets of estimates at 1% or lower level of significance.     
 
 
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Boosting education for  children from all background is essential for economic 
development, which not only entails a process of human capital accumulation but also 
generates useful externalities (e.g., lower fertility and/or better child health). Thus a 
better understanding of the process of school progression with late entry, conditional 
sequence with the previous level and self-selection into the next higher level is useful 
for any reassessment of the present education and/or employment policy in Peru.     21 
This paper analyses the factors determining  school  progression among 
Peruvian children aged 10-20 years. While primary enrolment is high, drop-out and 
failure rates are high too in Peru. This justifies the use of sequential analysis of school 
progression, which offers a finer understanding of the factors determining  school 
progression. A correlated sequential probit model is used to do so and it is argued that 
these selectivity corrected estimates that allows for conditional sequence/self selection 
and late entry are an improvement over the univariate logit or the ordered probit 
estimates commonly used in the literature.  
  Our results based on sequential probit estimates of 1994 Peru LSMS data are 
richer than most existing ones in that it shows how different individual, household and 
community characteristics affect school progression at different levels differently. An 
improvement of school attainment, especially at primary/secondary level crucially 
depends on whether children have educated parents and siblings in the working age 
category; while the former indicates preferences of educated parents to invest in child 
schooling, the latter reflects the lower opportunity costs of schooling among children 
with more working siblings supplementing family income. More interestingly, labour 
market participation does not  necessarily  adversely affect school attainment at 
primary/secondary level, but only at the post-secondary level, perhaps reflecting the 
flexibility of part-time employment in Peru.  Finally, choice of school type, i.e., 
public/private is important in school progression in Peru even among children born to 
same parents (with similar motivation for investment in child schooling) beyond the 
primary level, emphasizing the need for improving the quality of service provided by 
the public schools in the country; this is especially  important at a higher level of 
schooling. These results would highlight the importance of two sets of policies geared 
especially to lower alarming rates of drop-out at the primary and secondary levels of   22 
schooling. First, in stead of discouraging participation in wage employment, 
government or school authority may encourage children, especially poorer ones, to 
participate in part-time employment available locally. This can be accompanied by a 
second set of policies to improve the quality of services provided by the schools, 
especially public schools where  poorer children go to, including the quality of 
teaching and school environment as well as introducing more vocational programmes 
to help students to find part-time employment locally.    23 
TABLE 1. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF REGRESSION VARIABLES  
IN THE SEQUENTIAL SCHOOLING DECISIONS 
 
  PRIMARY VS NO 
SCHOOLING 




VARIABLE  NOBS  Mean  Std Dev  NOBS  Mean  Std Dev  NOBS  Mean  Std Dev 
                   
AGELE12  3873  11.71314  0.624546  3753  11.71276  0.625156  2030  11.99163  0.101389 
AGE1217  3873  2.543248  2.085653  3753  2.529976  2.08168  2030  3.764532  1.528995 
AGEGT17  3873  0.441518  0.902104  3753  0.432188  0.892547  2030  0.693103  1.049256 
MALE  3873  0.507875  0.500003  3753  0.50786  0.500005  2030  0.514286  0.499919 
FAILPRIM        3753  0.267786  0.557436       
FAILPS              2030  0.23399  0.540091 
MARRIED              2030  0.023153  0.150425 
SIB06  3873  0.906274  1.075528  3753  0.896616  1.069031  2030  0.675862  0.956603 
SIB718  3873  2.904209  1.378279  3753  2.904077  1.374597  2030  2.666995  1.379797 
SIBGT18  3873  1.181513  1.404078  3753  1.180123  1.404402  2030  1.473892  1.527813 
PREDEXP  3873 3.705996   0.3588748  3753  3.711018    0.3569642  2030  3.825926    0.335092    
DEBT  3873  0.1727343     0 .3780662  3753  0.172129    0.3775428  2030  0.1817734    0.3857527 
HEADMALE  3873  0.87968  0.325378  3753  0.879297  0.325826  2030  0.868966  0.337521 
HEADEDN1  3873  0.46708  0.49898  3753  0.465494  0.498874  2030  0.405911  0.491189 
HEADEDN2  3873  0.316034  0.464986  3753  0.320011  0.466542  2030  0.357143  0.479276 
HEADEDN3  3873  0.125742  0.331602  3753  0.127898  0.33402  2030  0.174877  0.379955 
HSPEDN1  3873  0.408211  0.491566  3753  0.411937  0.492249  2030  0.38867  0.487568 
HSPEDN2  3873  0.198812  0.399158  3753  0.199307  0.399533  2030  0.227094  0.419057 
HSPEDN3  3873  0.068939  0.253383  3753  0.07061  0.256207  2030  0.097044  0.296091 
PUBLIC        3753  0.898481  0.302055  2030  0.850246  0.356918 
INDIG  3873  0.142009  0.349104  3753  0.140155  0.347194  2030  0.097044  0.296091 
MALEMKT  3873  0.4301575  08253095  3753  0.4332534    0.8317286  2030  0.4990148    0.8994544 
MKT  3873  0.8399174     1.006275  3753  .8457234     1.011089  2030  0.9615764     1.063532 
MALEOWN  3873  0.8670281  1.313129  3753  .8681055     1.318205  2030  0.844335     1.335125 
OWN  3873  1.682159      1.37192  3753  1.68372     1.379639  2030  1.622167     1.450889 
RURAL   3873  0.615544  0.486529  3753  0.621903  0.484977  2030  0.747783  0.434392 
 
Note: AGELE12: if between 10-12 years; AGE1217: if between 12-17 years; AGEGT17: if 
between 18-20 years. MALE: 1 if male; FAILPRIM: number of years failed at the primary 
level; FAILPS: number of years failed at the primary and secondary levels; MARRIED : 1 if 
married; SIB06: number of siblings between 0-6 years;  SIB718 : number of siblings between 
7-18 years;  SIBGT18: number of siblings above 18 years; PREDEXP : predicted value of per 
capita household expenditure on food, health and education;  HEADMALE: 1 if the 
household head is a male; HEADEDN1: 1 if the household head has primary education;  
HEADEDN2  : 1 if the household head has secondary education; HEADEDN3: 1 if the 
household head has post-secondary education ; HSPEDN1 : 1 if the spouse of the household 
head has primary education;  HSPEDN2: 1if the spouse of the household head has secondary 
education; HSPEDN3 : 1 if the spouse of the household head has post secondary education;  
PUBLIC: 1 if the child goes to public school; INDIG: 1 if the household belongs to 
indigenous community; RURAL: 1 if the household lives in rural location; MKT: local adult 
market participation rate; OWN: local adult home participation rate; MALEMKT : interaction 
between MALE and MKT; MALEOWN:  interaction between MALE and OWN. 
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TABLE 2. SEQUENTIAL PROBIT ESTIMATES WITH AND WITHOUT 
INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY 
 
  Primary vs. no 
schooling 




 NO HET§  HET§§  NO HET§  HET§§  NO HET§  HET§§ 
CONS_1  -1.1939  -1.1356  -19.268 ***  22.6186 
*** 
19.0667 **  16.8057 * 
 2.5222  3.1162  2.2131  2.7805  8.5263  9.7366 
AGELE12  0.067  0.0633  1.2436 ***  1.4971 ***  -1.9986 ***  -2.0387 ** 
 0.097  0.1131  0.1227  0.1441  0.7353  0.8323 
AGE1217  -0.0487  -0.0503  0.4495 ***  0.5309 ***  0.6354 ***  0.7316 *** 
 0.0325  0.0374  0.021  0.0271  0.1705  0.191 
AGEGT17  -0.1280 **  -0.1633 **  -0.1926 ***  -0.2240 ***  0.3949 ***  0.4724 *** 
 0.0626  0.0712  0.0446  0.0505  0.0643  0.0774 
MALE  -0.0424  -0.0331  0.2018  0.2395  -0.2722  -0.3646 
 0.2152  0.2594  0.1239  0.1474  0.2086  0.2512 
FAILPRIM      -0.5656 ***  -0.6520 ***     
     0.054  0.0665     
FAILPS          -0.8413 ***  -0.9939 *** 
         0.2614  0.3226 
MARRIED          -0.6441 *  -0.689 
         0.375  0.4435 
SIB06  -0.0402  -0.0531  -0.0443  -0.0806  -0.054  -0.0055 
 0.0991  0.1246  0.066  0.0879  0.1295  0.1556 
SIB718  0.0354  0.0334  0.0274  0.024  -0.035  -0.0074 
 0.0695  0.087  0.0479  0.063  0.0864  0.1059 
SIBGT18  -0.0384  -0.0429  0.1013 ***  0.1270 ***  0.0344  0.0472 
 0.0451  0.0553  0.0246  0.0337  0.0414  0.0531 
PREDEXP  0.4989  0.5729  0.9288 **  0.9580 *  0.1742  0.6418 
 0.6002  0.7439  0.4414  0.5785  0.7681  0.9432 
DEBT  -0.1521  -0.1591  -0.0358  -0.058  0.1466  0.1733 
 0.1256  0.1632  0.0738  0.0991  0.125  0.1557 
HEADMALE  -0.3081 *  -0.4076 *  -0.0402  -0.1446  -0.0734  -0.1786 
 0.1668  0.2133  0.0961  0.1316  0.2081  0.2601 
HEADEDN1  0.3172 **  0.4239 **  0.2454 **  0.3998 ***  0.1144  0.2441 
 0.1503  0.1928  0.1067  0.1456  0.2459  0.3145 
HEADEDN2  0.4982 **  0.6835 **  0.5465 ***  0.7804 ***  0.1741  0.3449 
 0.2201  0.2842  0.1582  0.2132  0.3153  0.3967 
HEADEDN3  0.4526  0.5716  0.4001  0.6218 *  0.5095  0.6217 
 0.3067  0.3829  0.2538  0.3297  0.4129  0.5118 
HSPEDN1  0.2408 *  0.2534  0.1313 *  0.2224 **  0.1601  0.2767 
 0.1316  0.1652  0.0745  0.1019  0.1652  0.2131 
HSPEDN2  -0.1471  -0.2074  0.1484  0.2427  0.1317  0.1846 
 0.1905  0.2419  0.1311  0.174  0.2254  0.2822 
HSPEDN3  0.308  0.3239  0.3091  0.4351  0.3093  0.3639 
 0.4196  0.5026  0.2295  0.298  0.3329  0.4195 
PUBLIC      -0.4894 ***  -0.6123 ***  -0.4444 ***  -0.5279 *** 
     0.1487  0.1771  0.138  0.1685 
INDIG  0.1207  0.0858  0.2892 **  0.2815  0.1176  0.2168   25 
 0.1796  0.2276  0.13  0.1742  0.278  0.3438 
RURAL   0.2872 **  0.2772 *  0.3441 ***  0.4178 ***  0.0006  -0.0059 
 0.1296  0.16  0.0715  0.0984  0.1665  0.2063 
MALEMKT  0.0099  0.0037  -0.0293  -0.0281  0.0653  0.0871 
 0.1271  0.15  0.0622  0.0746  0.093  0.1135 
MKT  0.1463 *  0.1972 **  0.0442  -0.0583  -0.1375 *  -0.1703 * 
 0.0807  0.1006  -0.0462  0.0583  0.0718  0.088 
MALEOWN  0.0197  0.0266  -0.0525  -0.048  -0.008  0.0174 
 0.0912  0.1111  0.0452  0.0545  0.0703  0.0839 
OWN  0.1555 **  0.1974 **  -0.0288  -0.0314  -0.0304  -0.0604 
 0.0701  0.0865  0.0337  0.0427  0.0512  0.0634 
  Individual-level unobserved heterogeneity  
SIGIND    0.6631 ***         
    0.0648         
  Log-likelihood function 
ln-L  -2169.36  -2136.26         
  
Note: § : Estimates without heteorogeneity; §§: Estimates with individual heterogeneity. Asymptotic 
standard errors are shown below each estimate. * denotes that a variable is significant at 10%, ** 
denotes that at 5% while *** denotes the same at 1% level of significance. 
 
 
TABLE 3. ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES  
 
  No HET  HET 
Constant  -0.4926  -0.5531 ** 
  0.3007  0.2759 
AGELE12  0.1330 ***  0.1334 *** 
  0.0257  0.0233 
AGE1217  0.1228 ***  0.1212 *** 
  0.0062  0.0058 
AGEGT17  0.0258 **  0.0284 *** 
  0.0103  0.0097 
MALE  -0.0235  -0.0193 
  0.0158  0.0155 
MARRIED  -0.1847 ***  -0.1785 *** 
  0.0489  0.05 
SIB06  -0.0365 ***  -0.0365 *** 
  0.0077  0.0101 
SIB718  -0.0172 ***  -0.0155 ** 
  0.0055  0.0073 
SIBGT18  0.0237 ***  0.0241 *** 
  0.0057  0.0071 
EXPQRTL  0.0499 ***  0.0542 *** 
  0.0078  0.01 
HEADMALE  -0.0424 *  -0.0489 
  0.0257  0.0317 
HEADEDN1  0.1502 ***  0.1534 *** 
  0.0223  0.0298 
HEADEDN2  0.2499 ***  0.2569 *** 
  0.027  0.0356 
HEADEDN3  0.4063 ***  0.4143 ***   26 
  0.0344  0.0428 
HSPEDN1  0.0644 ***  0.0634 ** 
  0.0187  0.0247 
HSPEDN2  0.0568 **  0.0564 * 
  0.0259  0.0326 
HSPEDN3  0.2010 ***  0.2095 *** 
  0.0392  0.0462 
FAILPRIM  -0.2258 ***  -0.2170 *** 
  0.0505  0.049 
FAILPS  0.1239 ***  0.1251 *** 
  0.0451  0.0438 
PUBLIC  0.3935 ***  0.4313 *** 
  0.0171  0.0175 
SPANISH  -0.0366  -0.0258 
  0.0228  0.0298 
RURAL   0.1389 ***  0.1337 *** 
  0.0174  0.0228 
SIGU  0.3928 ***  0.3345 *** 
  0.005  0.0068 
  Individual-level Unobserved 
heterogeneity 
SIGDELTA    0.2090 *** 
    0.0111 
ln-L  -2621.11  -2577.45 
         
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are shown below each estimate. * denotes that a variable is 
significant at 10%, ** denotes that at 5% while *** denotes the same at 1% level of significance. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1. Sequential probit estimates excluding sibling composition variables 




  NO HET  HET  NO HET  HET  NO HET  HET 
CONS_1  -1.1899  -1.389  19.61 ***    23.678 ***  17.8495 **  16.9724 * 
  1.2192  1.4575  1.5128  1.825  7.8477  8.6605 
AGELE12  0.0692  0.0685  1.2506 ***  1.5117 ***  -2.007 ***  -2.083 *** 
  0.0954  0.1111  0.1211  0.1423  0.7139  0.7876 
AGE1217  -0.0473  -0.0509  0.4521 ***  0.5320 ***  0.6381 ***  0.7289 *** 
  0.0314  0.0359  0.0208  0.0267  0.1676  0.1851 
AGEGT17  -0.157 ***  -0.194 ***  -0.174 ***  -0.204 ***  0.4060 ***  0.4829 *** 
  0.0554  0.064  0.0433  0.0493  0.0601  0.073 
MALE  -0.0473  -0.0421  0.2106 *  0.2504 *  -0.2694  -0.3569 
  0.2129  0.2562  0.1215  0.1441  0.2065  0.2488 
MARRIED          -0.6386 *  -0.6711 
          0.368  0.4374 
FAILPRIM      -0.572 ***  -0.657 ***     
      0.0538  0.0662     
FAILPS          -0.847 ***  -0.995 *** 
          0.2602  0.3219 
PREDEXP  0.4999 ***  0.6306 ***  1.0038 ***  1.2004 ***  0.5128 **  0.7453 ** 
  0.1828  0.2319  0.1143  0.1539  0.2392  0.2906 
DEBT  -0.1485  -0.1627  -0.0568  -0.085  0.1386  0.1607 
  0.1211  0.1575  0.0725  0.097  0.1237  0.1539 
HEADMALE  -0.2673 *  -0.3545 *  -0.0454  -0.1391  -0.0737  -0.1978 
  0.1582  0.2012  0.0937  0.1273  0.1909  0.2422 
HEADEDN1  0.3149 **  0.4126 **  0.2328 ***  0.3595 ***  0.0634  0.2304 
  0.1333  0.1715  0.0874  0.1197  0.2169  0.2854 
HEADEDN2  0.4993 ***  0.6687 ***  0.4964 ***  0.6714 ***  0.0677  0.2995 
  0.1673  0.2173  0.1066  0.1461  0.2381  0.3102 
HEADEDN3  0.4501 *  0.5459 *  0.3671 **  0.5126 **  0.3583  0.5683 
  0.2489  0.3095  0.1872  0.2405  0.2772  0.3584 
HSPEDN1  0.2397 **  0.2485 *  0.1179 *  0.1899 **  0.1442  0.2739 
  0.1179  0.149  0.0651  0.0891  0.1478  0.1933 
HSPEDN2  -0.1388  -0.2118  0.1044  0.162  0.084  0.1654 
  0.1679  0.2145  0.1076  0.1416  0.1888  0.2392 
HSPEDN3  0.3061  0.3076  0.2208  0.2879  0.2288  0.336 
  0.3787  0.4521  0.2059  0.264  0.2548  0.3268 
RURAL   0.2747 **  0.2645 *  0.4042 ***  0.4761 ***  -0.007  0.0167 
  0.1121  0.1422  0.062  0.0856  0.1563  0.1931 
INDIG  0.1252  0.1042  0.2792 ***  0.3009 ***  0.2003  0.2328 
  0.1222  0.1548  0.085  0.1154  0.2104  0.2656 
PUBLIC      -0.469 ***  -0.581 ***  -0.439 ***  -0.527*** 
      0.1426  0.1698  0.1369  0.1673 
MALEMKT  0.0177  0.0145  -0.0386  -0.0365  0.0648  0.0834 
  0.1259  0.1479  0.061  0.0731  0.0927  0.1126 
MKT  0.1251 *  0.1711 *  0.0107  0.0088  -0.1228 *  -0.1456 * 
  0.0758  0.0947  0.043  0.0537  0.0696  0.0846 
MALEOWN  0.0233  0.0296  -0.0522  -0.0548  -0.0518  -0.0069 
  0.0894  0.109  0..0602  0.0441  0.053  0.0702 
OWN  0.1412 **  0.1821 **  0.0174  0.0262  -0.0213  -0.04   29 
  0.0676  0.0836  0.031  0.0389  0.0487  0.0598 
  Individual-level unobserved heterogeneity 
SIGIND    0.6104***         
    0.0870         
ln-L  -2217.03  -2163.24         
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are shown below each estimate. Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  
'***'=1%. 
 
Table A2. Sequential probit estimates excluding grade repetition variables 




  NO HET  HET  NO HET  HET  NO HET  HET 
CONS_1  -1.0468  -1.0269  19.5218 ***    23.3173 ***  19.2144 **  17.3638 * 
  2.5285  3.1716  2.1802  2.7919  8.2413  9.5455 
AGELE12  0.0648  0.0608  1.2213 ***  1.4936 ***  -2.024 ***  -2.143*** 
  0.097  0.1147  0.1228  0.1459  0.7114  0.8161 
AGE1217  -0.0483  -0.0519  0.4390 ***  0.5238 ***  0.6224 ***  0.7324 *** 
  0.0325  0.0377  0.0204  0.0267  0.1658  0.1878 
AGEGT17  -0.1292 **  -0.1631 **  -0.14***  -0.165 ***  0.4190 ***  0.5114 *** 
  0.0626  0.0716  0.0442  0.0501  0.0628  0.0771 
MALE  -0.0471  -0.0314  0.186  0.2324  -0.2838  -0.3852 
  0.215  0.2625  0.1185  0.143  0.2064  0.2513 
MARRIED          -0.5775  0.5495 
          0.3671  -0.446 
SIB06  -0.0455  -0.0542  -0.0266  -0.0559  -0.0494  0.0142 
  0.0993  0.1268  0.0636  0.0867  0.1271  -0.1554 
SIB718  0.0346  0.0299  0.0483  0.0451  -0.0247  0.0144 
  0.0695  0.088  0.0467  0.0631  0.084  -0.1049 
SIBGT18  -0.0387  -0.0445  0.1068 ***  0.1340 ***  0.0416  0.0584 
  0.0451  0.0561  0.0242  0.0338  0.0406  -0.0534 
PREDEXP  0.4651  0.5596  1.0364 **  1.1187 *  0.2122  0.7755 
  0.602  0.7564  0.4272  0.5738  0.7492  -0.9367 
DEBT  -0.1538  -0.1606  -0.0033  -0.0233  0.1403  0.1712 
  0.1255  0.1662  0.0724  0.0996  0.1219  0.1542 
HEADMAL  -0.3098 *  -0.4167 *  -0.0406  -0.1399  -0.1007  -0.2137 
  0.167  0.2179  0.0931  0.1314  0.2066  0.2623 
HEADEDN1  0.3211 **  0.4292 **  0.1713  0.3260 **  0.0483  0.1722 
  0.1503  0.1958  0.1049  0.1472  0.2381  0.3091 
HEADEDN2  0.5128 **  0.7061 **  0.4513 ***  0.6773 ***  0.102  0.2698 
  0.22  0.2883  0.1541  0.213  0.3072  0.393 
HEADEDN3  0.4701  0.5899  0.3608  0.5744 *  0.4647  0.5719 
  0.3069  0.3887  0.2485  0.3289  0.4022  0.5077 
HSPEDN1  0.2436 *  0.2541  0.1756 **  0.2688 ***  0.2045  0.3316 
  0.1315  0.1674  0.0728  0.1023  0.1613  0.2119 
HSPEDN2  -0.1465  -0.2139  0.2262 *  0.3314 *  0.1907  0.2539 
  0.1906  0.2457  0.1271  0.1733  0.2188  0.2777 
HSPEDN3  0.3156  0.3315  0.3806 *  0.5219 *  0.3917  0.4529 
  0.4199  0.5091  0.2245  0.2966  0.3259  0.4171 
PUBLIC      -0.539 ***  -0.688 ***  -0.469 ***  -0.557 *** 
      0.1413  0.172  0.1375  0.1697 
RURAL  0.2946 **  0.2861 *  0.3381 ***  0.4122 ***  -0.0182  -0.0213 
  0.1296  0.1619  0.069  0.0969  0.1595  0.2009   30 
INDIG  0.1103  0.0763  0.2590 **  0.2523  0.0738  0.1838 
  0.1798  0.2311  0.1271  0.1745  0.2642  0.3309 
MALEMKT  0.0103  -0.0001  -0.0215  -0.0216  0.0743  0.1027 
  0.1271  0.1523  0.0612  0.0744  0.0912  0.1123 
MKT  0.1479 *  0.2073 **  -0.0601  -0.0744  -0.1396 **  -0.1763 ** 
  0.0807  0.1025  0.0444  0.0574  0.0706  0.0875 
MALEOWN  0.024  0.0253  -0.0648  -0.0705  -0.0023  0.0251 
  0.0909  0.1122  0.0435  0.0533  0.0683  0.0824 
OWN  0.1555 **  0.2002 **  -0.022  -0.0216  -0.039  -0.0717 
  0.0701  0.0875  0.0322  0.0418  0.0498  0.0628 
  Individual-level unobserved heterogeneity 
SIGIND    0.6639***         
    0.064         
Ln-L  -2244.8  -2206.08         
   
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are shown below each estimate. Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  
'***'=1%. 
 